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ABSTRACT 
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M.A. Thesis, June 2016 
Supervisor: Assistant Prof. Özge Kemahlıoğlu   
Keywords: Islamist parties, party-cuing, voter behavior, religion and politics, Islamic 
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ABSTRACT 
 Can political parties shape opinions regarding religious matters? Over the recent 
years, Islamist parties across the world have de-emphasized Islamist themes in their 
electoral platforms (Kurzman and Turkoglu, 2015). This change is also evident in Turkey, 
where the political parties of the main Islamist movement have gradually dropped the 
platforms of Islamic economics from their party programs. Such changes within the 
Islamist parties could lead their followers to shift their focus away from the legal 
interpretation of religious corpora and move towards a more secularized vision of social 
order through the framing of their opinions by the political parties. Moreover, the changing 
rhetoric within the Islamist parties might also influence the opinions of the supporters of 
parties other than the Islamist parties. Yet the literature on voting behavior has found that 
political parties are the least successful in leading the opinions of voters regarding moral 
matters compared to other social or economic matters and religious claims are often unable 
to lead opinions in societal and political matters. In this study I utilize a convenience 
sample recruited via Facebook to investigate both in-group and out-group party-leading 
effects on the people’s perceptions of religious doctrines of Islamic economics, particularly 
the issues of inheritance distribution and interest-based banking, in Turkey. The evidence 
indicates that in-group party cuing does not exist, but out-group party cuing exists within 
the sample of the study. 
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ÖZET 
SİYASİ PARTİLER GÖRÜŞLERİ DİNİ KONULARDA ETKİLEYEBİLİR Mİ? SİYASİ 
PARTİLERİN PARTİ TARAFTARLARININ GÖRÜŞLERİNİ ETKİLEMESİNDE 
TÜRKİYE ÜZERİNDEN DENEYSEL SONUÇLAR 
SALİH YASUN 
Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Haziran 2016 
Tez Danışmanı: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Özge Kemahlıoğlu   
Anahtar kelimeler: İslami partiler, fikir oluşturma, seçmen davranışı, din ve siyaset, İslam 
ekonomisi 
ÖZET 
 Siyasi partiler dini konular üzerindeki görüşleri etkileyebilirler mi? Geçtiğimiz 
yıllarda, İslami görüşe sahip siyasi partiler parti programlarındaki İslami vurguları 
azaltmışlardır (Kurzman ve Turkoglu, 2015). Bu değişimi Türkiye’de de görmek 
mümkündür. Türkiye’deki ana İslami akıma bağlı olan partiler kademeli olarak parti 
programlarından İslam ekonomisine yaptıkları vurguları kaldırmışlardır. İslami görüşe 
sahip siyasi partilerdeki bu değişim bu partileri destekleyenlerin düşüncelerini 
şekillendirerek odaklarını dinin legalistsik yorumlamasından alıp daha seküler bir sosyal 
düzene yakınlaştırabilir. Dahası, İslami partilerin dışındaki partileri destekleyenler de 
İslami partilerdeki değişen retorikten etkilenebilir. Ancak seçmen davranışındaki akademik 
çalışmalar siyasi partilerin seçmenlerin görüşlerini etkilemede diğer sosyal ve ekonomik 
konularla karşılaştırıldığında en az başarıya ahlaki konularda ulaştıklarını ortaya 
koymuşlardır. Bununla birlikte dini ifadeler insanların toplumsal ve siyasi konulardaki 
görüşlerini çoğunlukla etkileyememektedirler. Facebook üzerinden kolayda örnekleme 
yöntemi kullandığım bu çalışmamda siyasi partilerin İslam dini öğretilerinin algıları 
üzerinden parti içi ve parti dışı seçmenlerin görüşlerini etkileme becerilerini Türkiye 
üzerinde inceliyorum. Çalışmada algıları ölçülen dini öğretiler İslami iktisat alanındaki 
miras bölüşümü ve faiz bankacılığı konularıdır. Bulgular bu çalışmadaki örneklemlerde 
parti içi görüş etkilemelerinin olmadığına fakat parti dışı görüş etkilemelerinin olduğuna 
işaret etmektedir.   
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the last years, Islamist parties across the world have significantly reduced their 
electoral platforms emphasizing Islamic themes (Kurzman and Turkoglu, 2015). This 
change is especially evident in Turkey, where the legalistic Islamist orientation of the 
National Order Movement (NOM) has shifted towards a pragmatic, identity based vision 
focusing on Islamic morals and values under the Justice and Development Party (AKP). 
For instance, the National Order Party proposed an interest free “Islamic economic model” 
and argued that regarding family law, the party was only interested in implementing 
Shariah (Erbakan, 1972). However, the Justice and Development party has favored an 
interest friendly, free market economy, while not referencing Islamic economics into its 
party program (Ak Parti, 2002; 2007; 2011; 2015).  
The changes of the Islamist movements across the world could lead the followers of 
Islamist movements to shift their focus away from the legal interpretation of religious 
corpora and move towards a more secularized vision of social order through the framing of 
their opinions by political parties. However, to my knowledge there is no study that 
investigates the influences of these conceptual changes of Islamic movements on their 
constituencies, or the role of political parties in leading the opinions of their voters in 
religious matters. In this study, I would like to assess by conducting a survey experiment 
whether the Turkish Islamist movement’s recent shifts away from Shariah law and towards 
legal positivism in Turkey also change its constituency’s concepts of Islamic economics 
through party identification, and whether statements coming from AKP cadre regarding 
Islamic economics influence the opinions of voters outside of the Islamist movement 
through out-group party cuing. 
The study’s structure is designed as follows: the next chapter provides a brief summary of 
the literature of party identification and leading opinion; the third chapter provides a brief 
summary of Islamic economics law and its practice in the Ottoman Empire; the fourth 
chapter describes the trajectory of the Islamist movement in Turkey and  the approach of 
the movement towards Islamic economics; the fifth chapter proposes the argument; the 
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sixth chapter describes the methodology and the sample; the seventh chapter provides the 
results; the eighth chapter provides a conclusion and a discussion; and the ninth chapter 
lists the references, and the tenth chapter provides an appendix. 
CHAPTER 2  
PARTY IDENTIFICATION AND LEADING OPINION 
 Political scientists have argued that political parties orient their positions based on 
the stance of voters to acquire the highest amount of votes (Downs, 1957; Hotelling, 1990; 
Osborne and Slivinski, 1996; McCarty and Meirowitz 2007); political parties reflect the 
principal cleavages in a given society (Lipset and Rokan, 1967); or create social blocks by 
articulating and integrating some identities and collectivities and suppressing others (De 
Leon et al., 2009).  A new line of research suggests that voters might also orient their 
opinions and policy preferences based on the cues that they receive from political parties. A 
cue is a message through which people may “infer other information and make decisions 
(Bullock, 2011)”, and political parties are suppliers of “cues by which the individual may 
evaluate the elements of politics (Kam, 2005).” 
These claims about the effectiveness of party cues and policy messages are based 
upon the dual-process of attitude change between the “systematic” and “heuristic” 
information processing (Kam, 2005; Bullock, 2011). Systematic processing “allocates 
attention to the effortful mental activities that demand it, including complex computations 
(Kahneman, 2011).” Heuristic processing is the reliance on the ease of memory to make 
judgments with little or no effort, and it has no voluntary control (Kahneman, 2011; 
Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). The concept of heuristic processing can be applied to 
memory-based models, according to which the preferences of individuals are established on 
whichever consideration happens to be accessible and people make their judgements on the 
considerations most accessible in memory (Druckman and Lupia, 2000). When there is no 
specific processing goal for an individual, then there is no need for spending energy on 
utilizing energy, and the individual may build her evaluation “on whatever information that 
is accessible (Druckman and Lupia, 2000).” In surveys, most respondents do not anticipate 
the survey questions, and therefore utilizes memory-based evaluations (Kinder 1998; 
Druckman and Lupia, 2000). This finding is in line with the recent empirical research, 
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which has found that party cues are processed heuristically, that is through the ease of 
memory with little voluntary control (Rahn, 1993; Kam, 2005). As individuals establish 
psychological identification towards a political party, they obtain a “perceptual screen” 
through which they observe what is favorable according to their partisan orientation 
(Campbell, 1960). This “perceptual screen” might work through two main mechanisms 
(Brader and Tucker, 2009). First, individuals might choose to support a position because 
their preferred parties support it. Second, individuals might be able to offer opinions on 
issues thanks to partisan cues. These mechanisms can be explained as either a “rational 
information shortcut” that eases away the necessity of evaluating, or a “latent psychological 
bias”, that people are automatically attracted to the policies of their party, distorting their 
perception and preventing them from making meaningful evaluations. (Brader et al., 2012; 
Healy et. al, 2014). 
Numerous empirical studies have examined the roles of political parties in 
influencing the opinions of their voters. Some of these studies have focused on party-cuing 
effects on policy-related issues, whereas others have focused on individual perceptions of 
public officials and individual ideological positions. The studies that focused on policy-
related issues have been conducted in many different countries. On policy-related issues, 
Samuels and Zucco (2014) examined party-cuing effects in Brazil;  Sio et al (2013) in Italy;  
Brader et al (2010; 2012) in the UK, Hungary, and Poland;  Brader and Tucker (2009) in 
Russia; Slothuus and de Vreese (2010) in Denmark; and Bullock (2011), Kuo (2005) and 
Goren (2005) in the US. Healy et al (2014) examined party identification effects on 
individual perceptions of public officials in the US, Campbell et al. (1960) and Arceneaux 
(2008) examined on candidates in the US, Carsey and Layman (2006) and Goren (2005) 
examined the effects of party identification on social and political concepts in the US. The 
results of these studies indicate that parties are not able to cue the opinions of voters 
uniformly on different issues. Parties are more successful at leading the opinions of voters 
on issues that are less salient, and more complex and remote from personal experience, 
such as electoral reforms, offshore oil drilling, food irradiation, and federalism (Sio et al, 
2013; Samuels and Zucco, 2014; Kam 2005; Arceneaux 2008). However, parties are not as 
successful at leading the opinions of voters on high-salience, real world, and moral issues 
about which are easier for voters to judge, such as health insurance, affirmative action, gay 
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rights, senior rights and abortion (Kam 2005; Arcenaux, 2008; Sio et al, 2013; Bullock 
2011; Slothuus and de Vreese 2010). Political scientists have come up with mechanisms 
explaining the success of party-cuing on issues that are less salient, more complex, and 
remote from personal experience. Campbell (1960) argued that individuals utilize party 
cues when the issues are far removed from the world because “voters can learn indirectly 
through political parties what they can’t learn directly through experience.” According to 
Sio et al (2013) and Bullock (2011), party cues are less effective in real-world, salient 
issues because voters might have developed stable and resilient opinions on these issues, 
curbing the ability of political parties to influence their opinions.  
 The current research examines party-cuing effects on religious matters in Turkey in 
particular Qur’anic doctrines of Islamic economics. The current study contributes to the 
literature of party cuing through four important mechanisms. First, to my knowledge this is 
the first study that examines party cuing effects on individual perceptions regarding 
religious doctrines. The previous research has identified that parties are less effective in 
cuing the opinions of voters on moral matters. In addition, a previous study by Jamal et al 
(2014) examined religious cuing on the issues of women’s empowerment and economic 
policy in a nationally representative sample of Egypt. The research identified that the 
framing of political claims as religious ones mostly did not succeed in increasing the 
receptivity and compliance with political claims, showing the limits of religious cuing in 
leading opinions.  Moreover, the research by Adkins et al. (2013) examined in a nationally 
representative sample in the USA religious group cues based on Evangelical-Catholic 
leaders on issues such as protection of homosexuals at work-place, improving socio-
economic conditions of African Americans, and providing government sponsored health-
insurance. The research found out no significant “in group party cuing”, meaning that 
Catholics, Protestants and Evangelical Protestants’ opinions are not moved by the cues 
provided by their religious leaders. These researches showed the limitations of religious 
cues in shaping opinions. As religiosity remains one of the main pillars of the morality of a 
majority of individuals, studying the role of party cuing on religious matters can reveal the 
extent to which parties can influence the opinions of their constituencies on moral matters.  
Second, the current study examines party cuing effects on salient and non-salient issues 
within the religious domain with the aim of contributing to the debate about the saliency of 
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issues on which parties can influence the opinions of their constituencies. Third, the current 
research contributes to the literature on out-group party cuing regarding religious matters. 
The research by Adkins et al (2013) found out significant out-group party cuing, such that 
the cues led religiously unaffiliated Democrats to more liberal views in provision of job 
assistance for homosexuals at work-place and improving the socio-economic conditions of 
African Americans. The current research can contribute to the debate on out-group party 
cuing by providing evidence about whether the opinions of individuals close to political 
parties other than AKP can be shaped by party cues led by AKP. Fourth, the current 
research sheds light on the capacities of Islamist parties in leading opinions. 
CHAPTER 3  
ISLAMIC ECONOMICS LAW IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 
 In Arabic, the term “Shariah” means “road”, “path” or “way” to a watering hole 
(Keshavjee, 2013). It is a sacred law that governs a Muslim’s relationship with the Creator, 
with fellow human beings, and the environment (Schacht, 1982; Keshavjee, 2013). 
However, theologians differ among themselves about which sources should be considered 
as Shariah law in guiding Muslims’ relationships with fellow human beings. The Qur’an 
contains about 6000 verses and “no more than approximately 80 verses deal with legal 
topics in the strict sense of the term (Coulson, 2011).” The mainstream view regarding the 
sources of Shariah law is that it is a supplementation of Qur’anic verses with the Hadith 
and Sunna (words and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad), ijma (consensus among Muslim 
scholars), qiyas (comparison of teachings of the Qur’an with those of the Hadith), and 
ijtihad (independent reasoning) (Ucok and Mumcu 1985). However, some Islamic scholars 
have argued that the Qur’an is sufficient as a source of guidance (Musa, 2008). Others have 
argued that Shariah law is the reinterpretation of Qur’anic verses, the Hadith and Sunnah 
based on changing needs and circumstances. According to this school of thought, laws can 
be reinterpreted as long as new laws abide by the main principles of Islam: the pursuit of 
fairness, justice, and compassion; and progression along  the path of God  (Mahmassani, 
2014).  In Shi’a law, imams (the leaders of the Muslim community) are considered the 
authorities and carry as much weight as the Qur’an, Hadith, and Sunna in forming Islamic 
laws (Keshavjee, 2013). In the absence of imams, laws are governed by mujtahids, 
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members of the religious hierarchy who have high degrees of expertise in legal theory and 
practice (Keshavjee, 2013). 
The Ottoman Empire followed the Hanafi approach to Islamic Law, which favored 
the Qur’an to other sources of  Shariah (Ozel, 1997). Judges-kadis, responsible for the 
oversight of Shariah laws, were educated in centralized locations of the empire and were 
appointed to their posts by the decrees of the sultans (Ortayli, 2001; Barkey, 2007). As a 
result, judges favored the Empire’s official school of jurisprudence (Hanafi school) over 
other schools, which meant that they prioritized the Qur’an over other sources of Shariah.  
Some issues, such as inheritance and usury are described in the Qur’an with 
clarity12. Inheritance is the most detailed economic rule within the Qur’an (Kuran, 2011), 
which granted the male recipient of a/the deceased the share of two female recipients 
(Aktan, 2005). The Quranic Inheritance Law was replaced by the Turkish Civil Code in 
1926, equalizing the level of inheritance between men and women (Akyol, 2012).   
Islamic scholars have disagreed on whether the Qur’anic ban on usury also included 
a ban on commercial banking activities (Afzal, 2007). The mainstream Islamic taught in the 
Ottoman Empire historically interpreted the Qur’an as having formally banned  interest 
based transactions involving the transfer of all risks to the borrower (Berkes, 1998, Cizakca 
2010). As a result, the practice of interest based banking transferring all risks to the 
borrower was formally banned in the Ottoman Empire (Berkes, 1998). The financial sector 
                                                          
1 Regarding inheritance, verse (Surah) Al Nisaa explicitly describes how inheritance should be distributed 
“Allah instructs you concerning your children: for the male, what is equal to the share of two females. But if 
there are [only] daughters, two or more, for them is two thirds of one's estate. And if there is only one, for 
her is half. And for one's parents, to each one of them is a sixth of his estate if he left children. But if he had 
no children and the parents [alone] inherit from him, then for his mother is one third. And if he had brothers 
[or sisters], for his mother is a sixth, after any bequest he [may have] made or debt. Your parents or your 
children – you know not which of them are nearest to you in benefit. [These shares are] an obligation 
[imposed] by Allah. Indeed, Allah is ever Knowing and Wise. Surah al Nisaa 4:11 (The Quran, Saheeh 
International).” 
2 “Those who consume interest cannot stand [on the Day of Resurrection] except as one stands who is being 
beaten by Satan into insanity. That is because they say, "Trade is [just] like interest." But Allah has permitted 
trade and has forbidden interest. So whoever has received an admonition from his Lord and desists may 
have what is past, and his affair rests with Allah. But whoever returns to [dealing in interest or usury] – 
those are the companions of the Fire; they will abide eternally therein. Bakarah 275 (The Quran, Saheeh 
International)”.  
In addition, in his farewell address, the Prophet Muhammed said “Allah has forbidden you to take usury 
(interest), therefore all interest obligations shall henceforth be waived (Ali, 1998).’   
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in the Empire resorted to alternative mechanisms for financial activities, which aimed at 
both borrowers and lenders sharing the  risks of borrowing (Cizakca, 2014). The ban on  
interest based banking involving the transfer of all risks to the borrower ended in the 19th 
century when the first Western-style interest-based bank was allowed to be opened for the 
Ottoman Empire to be able to economically compete with European powers. (Kuran, 2011). 
Currently, there are both interest-free and interest-based banks in Turkey, with interest-
based banks constituting about 95% of total banking shares (Hardy, 2012). 
CHAPTER 4 
ISLAMIST PARTIES AND ISLAMIC ECONOMICS IN TURKEY 
Turkey experienced democratic transition in the late 1940s with two major political 
parties: the CHP and the DP. The cleavage between these two parties rested on the center-
periphery conflict with a nationalist, laicist, cohesive state elite supporting the CHP and a 
culturally heterogeneous and complex periphery with religious backgrounds supporting the 
DP (Mardin, 1973; Ozbudun, 2000; Kalaycioglu, 2008). The DP obtained power through 
the first free and fair elections in 1950 and maintained it until the military coup in 1960. If 
Islamism means advocating the utilization of divine Islamic laws, The Democrat Party was 
not an Islamist Party. For instance, Celal Bayar, who remained the leader of DP from the 
founding of the party in 1946 until 1950 and the President from 1950 to 1960 stated, “We 
will never cherish Shariah and reactionism in Turkey (Sitembolukbasi, 1995)”. The party 
elite often took strides to weaken the influence of the Islamist wing within the party 
(Sitembolukbasi, 1995). However, the DP took a much softer tone towards Islam than the 
CHP and aimed to incorporate Islam into the Turkish political scene as a “living cultural 
tradition” (Ayata, 1996). Religion not only was a “necessary social cement” for the unity of 
society, but it also was an appropriate tool for a political discourse that opposed the secular 
platform of the Westernized elite (Ayata, 1996). The DP’s laicism was not against the 
revival of Islam, but was against the establishment of a theocratic state (Sitembolukbasi, 
1995). The DP made great strides in responding to the demands of its religious 
constituency, such as re-legalizing the Arabic call for prayer (adhan), having the Qur’an 
broadcast at the National Radio Station, the addition of religion courses to the primary 
school curriculum, the reopening of theological schools serving the Muslim community, 
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and tolerating the spread of Qur’anic courses (Sitembolukbasi 1995; Tunaya, 1991). As a 
result, the DP was considered as the “Savior of Islam” by the religious constituency 
(Tunaya, 1991). The DP was closed down in 1960 following a military coup. After the 
DP’s closure, the two parties that inherited the DP’s constituency, the Justice Party (AP) 
and the New Turkey Party (YTP), followed the same attitude towards religion and 
secularism. 
The first Islamist party in Turkey in the sense of advocating the utilization of divine 
laws was the National Order Party-“Milli Nizam Partisi”, which was founded in 1970 with 
considerable support from Sufi orders-tarikats (Cinar and Duran, 2008). The party 
followers referred to their ideology as the national outlook-“milli görüş” and their 
movement as the national outlook movement-“NOM”. The movement claimed to promote 
“national and moral values”, which is understood as the promotion of Islamic values (Hale 
and Ozbudun, 2010). The first NOM party was not able to make inroads into the Turkish 
electorate, as it was closed in 1971 by the Constitutional Court following another military 
coup (Cinar, Duran, 2008).  
In 1972, the NOM formed another party under the same leadership as the National 
Order Party. The new party was called the National Salvation Party-“MSP (Milli Selamet 
Partisi)”. The MSP became part of a coalition government in 1974, and had a modest level 
of support between 1972 and its closure in 1980, as its vote share never exceeded 12% 
(Ozbudun, 2000). The party had a legalistic Islamist approach as the party’s founding 
statement, written by the party’s founder Necmettin Erbakan, proposed an “Islamic 
economic model” without interest as an alternative to the capitalist and communist models 
(Erbakan, 1972). The founding statement also stated that, “Regarding family law……, we 
are not interested in any views other than the views that are rightful according to law 
(Shariah) (Erbakan, 1972)34”. Although the party did not have a clear stance regarding 
dividing inheritance, its abidance by Shariah in family law may suggest that it  may have 
favored the  distribution of inheritance  stipulated in the Qur’an. Although the percentage of 
                                                          
3 The statement in Turkish is “Biz aile hukukuna ve karı-koca ile aile efradının birbirleriyle olan 
münasebetlerinde meşru hukuk nizamımız dışındaki görüşlere iltifat etmiyoruz” 
4 The word “meşru” means “according to law” in today’s Turkish. However, in Ottoman Turkish the word 
meant “According to Shariah”. Given the religious tone and the written time of the founding statement, 
“According to Shariah” is the term that the author likely used. 
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MSP supporters favoring Shariah is not known, the support for Shariah law was around 7% 
in Turkey during the 1970s and 1980s according to a report in the weekly magazine Nokta 
in 1986 (Carkoglu, 2004). 
 The MSP was closed following the military coup in 1980. The Welfare Party-“RP 
(Refah Partisi)” succeeded the MSP in 1984 through retaining its cadres. The party 
constantly outperformed expectations in the elections, reaching its apogee in 1995 when it 
acquired 21.4% of the total vote, representing political Islam’s best showing ever until that 
date (Hale and Ozbudun, 2010). The RP became a major partner of a coalition between 
1996 and 1997, and Necmettin Erbakan, the party’s chairman, became the prime minister 
during that period, representing the first NOM party in the history of Turkey to hold the 
office of the prime ministry. The RP’s stance on Shariah law was vague and contradictory 
(Ozbudun, 2000). Regarding the economy, RP proposed an Islamic “just order” in which  
interest based transactions would be abolished (Refah Partisi, 1985). Necmettin Erbakan, 
the founder and the chair of RP, wrote a book called Just Economic Order-Adil Ekonomik 
Düzen, in which he referred to an/the “interest based capitalist system” as a “slavery 
system” and argued that under the RP governance “the parasite called interest” would be 
abolished (Erbakan, 1991). Contrary to the MSP’s statement, the party did not make any 
statements in its program regarding the Islamic Law in general or any specific aspects of 
Islamic inheritance law. However, the representatives of RP occasionally proposed 
amendments to allow individuals to choose their source of laws, whether Cannon, Shariah, 
or Civil Code (Akyol, 1996; Ozbudun and Hale, 2010). Rusen Cakir, arguing that the 
ambiguity towards Shariah was due to the abundance of approaches to the subject, said: 
“The RP is neither pro-Shariah, nor democrat, because it is pro-Shariah and democrat in its 
own way (Cakir, 1994)”. A 1995 survey revealed that 61.3% of RP supporters favored 
Shariah Law, and a 1996 survey showed that 60.6% of RP voters favored having some 
Islamic principles in the constitution (Hale and Ozbudun, 2010). However, Arat (2005) 
revealed the ambiguity of the concept of Shariah Law that existed among some of the 
constituencies of RP through interviews with female RP supporters. Her study showed that 
female RP supporters disagreed with the statement that women were deregulated in Islam 
on issues such as polygamy, divorce, witnessing, and inheritance. Also, their responses 
revealed that they had different interpretations of Islam. Some argued that Islamic doctrines 
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regarding women were misunderstood because such doctrines did not restrict women; 
others argued that were no such doctrines. Most of the respondents were vague in their 
responses or were disinterested; however, they had strong faiths. 
 The RP was closed by a state prosecution in 1998 based on the claim that the 
speeches of several party leaders were against the secular constitution (Çarkoğlu, 2004). 
Almost all excluded members of the RP moved to the newly formed the Virtue Party-“FP 
(Fazilet Partisi)”, which became the new NOM party of Turkey. The NOM movement 
experienced its major change from a legalistic approach towards Islam to an approach 
towards Islam’s moral values and principles under the FP, as the FP ceased to make explicit 
references to Islam or challenging the secular system (Hale and Ozbudun, 2010). The party 
embraced a liberal economic approach while downgrading its opposition to interest. While 
the previous NOM parties openly declared their opposition to interest in their statements, 
the FP only mentioned that it is against “economic rent” (Fazilet Partisi, 1998), which is a 
broad term that may include interest-based transactions. The FP avoided making references 
to Islamic Law and included a section in its founding statement declaring that, "the 
education of women will be prioritized in order to make them successful in their socio 
economic lives (Fazilet Partisi, 1998).” The party also supported Turkey’s bid for the EU 
membership, believing that the EU could protect religious freedoms in Turkey (Hale and 
Ozbudun, 2010). Despite the moderate position of the party, the Constitutional Court in 
2001 banned it because of its perceived anti-secular and anti-Republican activities (Hale 
and Ozbudun, 2010). While the old cadre of FP moved on to form the Felicity Party-“SP 
(Saadet Partisi)” and returned to the RP’s policies of just order-“adil düzen” (Saadet 
Partisi, 2002), the reformist camp within the party moved away from the old cadre and 
formed the Justice and Development Party-“AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi)”. Even 
though the AKP initially rejected any continuation with the NOM, likely to prevent the 
party closure, the party’s grassroots and cadre remained as the former NOM members (Hale 
and Ozbudun 2010, Yildiz 2008). The party has described itself as a “conservative 
democrat” party and built its party platform upon the FP’s liberalization policies, as it 
favored a free market economy (Yalcin, 2004). In addition, in its 2002 platform the party 
promoted broad improvements in individual freedoms and rights, and wanted Turkey to 
become a member of the EU. According to the party’s 2002 platform, the AKP aimed to 
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broaden the capacities of the financial sector and advocated for improvements in women’s 
rights and freedoms through civil society organizations, educational improvements, and 
state policies to curb gender-based discrimination (Ak Parti, 2002). Ihsan Dagi, a prominent 
political scientist, argued that the AKP abandoned Islamism as a political program that 
opposed globalization and building ties with the West while maintaining its Islamic 
credentials on expanding the rights and the reach of its constituency on social and 
economic issues (Dagi, 2005). Etyen Mahcupyan, the advisor to the former Prime Minister 
Davutoglu, made a similar comment very recently: “[The AK Party’s] Islamism only acts 
as a moral and normative background that can be relied on at critical moments. The Islamic 
references AK Party leaders use do not have any function other than to appeal to common 
emotions and sensitivity of the public (Mahcupyan, 2015).” 
 However, the party, especially at the grassroots level, has remained sensitive to  
Islamic moral issues (Hale and Ozbudun, 2010). For instance, a 2002 survey showed that 
the 52% of AKP voters were in favor of regulating inheritance practices according to 
Islamic law, and the 60% of AKP voters were against conducting interest-based business 
affairs (Hale and Ozbudun, 2010). 
Overall, examining the party platforms has shown a clear shift has occurred within 
the NOM movement away from the classic interpretation of Islamic economics law. This 
shift can be summarized in Table 1:.   
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Issues
National Salvation Party (MSP) 1972-1981
Interest Against interest
Economic Model "Islamic Economic Model"
Reference to Shariah Regarding Inheritance Yes
Women's Role in the Society Specifies women's role as outlined in Qur'an
Welfare Party (RP) 1983-1998
Interest Against interest
Economic Model "Just order"
Reference to Shariah Regarding Inheritance Not emphasized in the program.
Women’s Role in the Society Not emphasized in the program.
Virtue Party (FP) 1998-2001
Interest Not emphasized in the program.
Economic Model Liberal economy without "rent economy"
Reference to Shariah Regarding Inheritance Not emphasized in the program.
Women’s Role in the Society Emphasis on improving women's education
2002 Program Justice and Development Party (AKP) 2001-Present
Interest Not emphasized in the program.
Economic Model Liberal economy
Reference to Shariah Regarding Inheritance Not emphasized in the program.
Women's Role in the Society A whole section devoted to women's issues
such as women's rights, freedoms, ending discrimination and honor 
killings.
2007 Program Justice and Development Party (AKP) 2001-Present
Interest Not emphasized in the program.
Economic Model Liberal economy
Reference to Shariah Regarding Inheritance Not emphasized in the program.
Women's Role in the Society A whole section devoted to elderly, children, family and women's 
issues including the achievements and future platforms on improving 
the rights and status of women.
2011 Program Justice and Development Party (AKP) 2001-Present
Interest Not emphasized in the program.
Economic Model Liberal economy
Reference to Shariah Regarding Inheritance Not emphasized in the program.
Women's Role in the Society A whole section devoted women's issues including the 
achievements and future platforms on improving the rights and status 
of women
2015 Program Justice and Development Party (AKP) 2001-Present
Interest Not emphasized in the program.
Economic Model Liberal economy
Reference to Shariah Regarding Inheritance Not emphasized in the program.
Women's Role in the Society Emphasis on positive discrimination for women
Felicity Party (SP) 2001-Present
Interest Against interest
Economic Model "Just order"
Reference to Shariah Regarding Inheritance Not emphasized in the program.
Women's Role in the Society Emphasis on improving women’s working conditions.
The Positions of NOM Parties on Islamic Economics as Outlined in their Party Programs
Table 1
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CHAPTER 5 
ARGUMENTS 
Plenty of reasons exist to suggest that AKP voters may resort to party cues in 
formulating their opinions in religious matters. First,  recent research by Carkoglu and 
Kalaycioglu (2009) has revealed that when confronted with complex social or political 
issues, Turkish voters bypass the essentially discomforting complexity of real-world 
phenomena with reference to the guidance of experts and leaders (Carkoglu and 
Kalaycioglu 2009). As the interpretation of religious matters can be regarded as a complex 
issue, voters might resort to the opinions of their leaders in evaluating religious issues. 
Esma Erdogan (2006) previously examined the perceptions of former RP and current AKP 
voters regarding accession to the EU through in-depth interviews. Her analysis concluded 
that after leaving the RP and joining the AKP, the voters’ perceptions of the EU changed. 
They no longer regarded the EU as a Christian group, and most of them supported Turkey’s 
EU bid. The author concluded that party policies towards the EU shaped the perceptions of 
women regarding the membership bid (Erdogan, 2006). The evidence that the AKP has 
successfully influenced the opinions of its constituency regarding  EU accession is a 
preliminary sign suggesting  that the AKP could also influence the opinions of its 
constituency regarding religious matters. 
Second, the concept of Shariah law is very ambiguously understood by the Turkish 
electorate, which may allow for  party identification to have an influence over the concept. 
Carkoglu (2004) examined the perceptions of Turkish society towards Shariah law by 
analyzing a survey conducted in 1999. The survey allowed individuals to compare the 
present day civil code regulations about marriage, divorce, and inheritance with the 
doctrines of Shariah law as stipulated in the Qur’an. The survey indicated that 
approximately 20% of the general population favored Shariah law as an overall concept. 
However, the support for the implications of Shariah law, specifically regarding the role of 
women in society, remained very low. 72% of Shariah supporters were against marriage 
according to the Islamic law, 68% of Shariah supporters were against switching to the 
inheritance model as stipulated in the Qur’an, and 57% were against changing divorce 
arrangements in favor of Shariah law. According to Carkoglu and Kalaycioglu (2007), such 
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findings suggest that the approval of Shariah rule could simply be a proxy for the reactions 
to the economic and political hardships in the country rather than being a religious based 
legal and political ideology. Carkoglu and Kalaycioglu’s (2007) argument suggests that 
individuals support Shariah law not because of theological reasons, but because the concept 
of Shariah law arrives as an alternative to the current system that individuals attribute with 
economic and political unease. Gareth Jenkins brought a different perspective regarding the 
ambiguity of Sharia law in Turkey. According to him, the Islamists in countries other than 
Turkey treat the “age of felicity” of the Prophet and the first four Caliphs as their guidance. 
However, for Turkish Muslims the “primary historical reference point is the Ottoman 
Empire, or at least their perception of the empire as a paradigm of peace, tolerance and 
social harmony (Ozbudun and Hale, 2010).” As a result, the adherence to the Ottoman 
Empire as a paradigm rather than to a legalistic interpretation of the “age of felicity” 
enables Turkish Muslims to prioritize  Islamic values and morals over the legalistic 
approaches of Shariah law (Ozbudun and Hale, 2010). 
The arguments that I have raised suggest the following hypothesis: 
H1: The AKP can successfully lead the opinions of its constituency regarding  religious 
matters. 
Hypothesis 1 is supported if the AKP can lead opinions on one of the issues 
investigated, either the interest or inheritance issue. 
I also suggest that the AKP’s ability to lead the opinions of its constituency in 
religious matters can vary depending on the subject matter. On the one hand, the utilization 
of interest  is still debated in the Islamic circle of Turkey. Some religious theologians argue 
that conducting interest based transactions is a sin, while others argue that it is not a sin 
(Karaman, 2003). As previously explained, the electorate of the AKP also seems to be 
divided about utilizing interest, as some approve while others disapprove it. The interest 
issue remains very complex and salient with theologians raising contrasting opinions.  
 On the other hand, Turkey embraced the Civil Code almost a century ago. As a 
result, the private law dimension of Shariah law is no longer discussed in public debates as 
an alternative to the current Civic Code. This may have led the domain of private laws to 
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remain as a non-salient issue. For instance, the subject of women’s rights as prescribed in 
Islam was absent among the discussions of Islamists  as early as the 1950s, indicating that 
they either accepted the Republic’s policies towards gender equality, or they no longer 
prioritized the subject (Sitembolukbasi, 1999). In addition, studying FP supporters’ 
opinions regarding  Shariah Law, Arat (2003)  stated that “there were no imminent 
implications of these (private) laws for their (the women’s) personal lives …. women could 
afford to think of Islam as the ideal system that they believed it to be…. The secular 
context in which the women lived and the guarantees that the secular civil code provided 
made the issue of male dominance within Islam a non-issue. Their meaning and 
consequences were not real.”   
 I expect there to be differences regarding the AKP’s ability to lead  opinions 
between the concepts of interest based transactions and inheritance division. The division 
of  inheritance  remains as a less-salient issue, as currently there are no debates or 
mechanisms in Turkey for the implementation of Islamic law in dividing inheritance. 
However, the utilization of interest appears to be  a salient issue, as individuals can conduct 
interest-free banking and there are continuing debates regarding its lawfulness according to  
Islamic law. Following the consensus in the literature that political parties are more 
successful in leading opinions in less salient issues than more salient issues (Sio et al, 2013; 
Samuels and Zucco, 2014; Kam 2005; Arceneaux 2008; Bullock 2011), I propose the 
following hypothesis: 
 H2: The AKP can lead the opinions of its constituency more successfully regarding 
the interpretation of Islamic inheritance law than regarding the utilization of interest based 
transactions. 
 I also would like to test out-group party cuing on my dataset. Individuals may 
consider the people whom they perceive as different from themselves as members of an 
“out-group” (Samuels and Zucco, 2014). Out-group perception develops through prejudice, 
hostility and inter-group stereotyping (Koeing and King, 1964). As previously mentioned, 
in heuristic processing people make “judgements on the considerations most accessible in 
the memory (Druckman and Lupia, 2000).” In evaluating a statement made by a party, 
people may resort to judgements about that party available in their memory, which may 
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include negative perceptions towards that party. In that case, individuals who feel affinity 
with one party may develop negative perceptions towards other political parties (Samuels 
and Zucco, 2014).   
Currently 76% of Turkish citizens are against becoming neighbors with individuals 
supporting political parties that they feel distanced from (The Black Sea Trust for Regional 
Cooperation, 2016). Therefore, the out-grouping based on political partisanship may exist 
in Turkey. The research on political party cuing shows evidence in favor of out-group party 
cuing in Brazil in issues such as offshore oil drilling (Samuels and Zucco, 2014). In 
addition, the research on religious group cues finds evidence in favor of out-group party 
cuing (Adkins et al, 2013). In the case of my dataset, individuals who feel close to a party 
other than the AKP may develop negative perceptions towards statements made by AKP 
officials and pick ideas opposite to those raised by AKP officials. I propose the following 
hypothesis about out-group party-cuing: 
 H3: Individuals that feel close to political parties other than the AKP are likely to 
choose the contrary of ideas raised by AKP leaders.  
CHAPTER 6 
METHODOLOGY AND SAMPLE 
 The current research has been conducted through an online experiment by adopting 
party-mention treatments to specific policy formulations. The aims of the current research 
are to understand whether the changing discourse within the NOM regarding Islamic 
economics that has lasted in the AKP could shift the opinions of the individuals who feel 
affinity with the AKP through identification, and whether the recent discourse could lead 
the opinions of other party supporters as a result of the out-group party cuing.  
 Survey evidence and panel studies ask individuals to evaluate the issues endorsed 
by specific parties. However, such approaches may lead to the endogeneity problem 
regarding testing party cuing, as individuals’ opinions on a given issue may be influenced 
by partisanship, and partisanship may influence opinions on the issue (Brader and Tucker, 
2010). As a result, scholars have utilized survey experiments to test party cuing effects  by 
comparing control and treatment groups, as neither standard survey evidence nor panel 
Yasun 17 
 
  
 
studies have the capacity  to solve the endogeneity problem, that partisanship may both 
influence and be influenced by opinions and evaluations about a given issue due to the 
difficulty of tracing the role of political parties in leading the opinions (Brader and Tucker, 
2010).  
 Questions in this study covered the issues of inheritance and interest as well as 
demographics, evaluations of individuals on their religiosity and secularism, and the 
political preferences of individuals. I have modified the language of questions based on a 
previous study conducted about/on religiosity in Turkey by Carkoglu and Toprak (2000). I 
did not use any deception in party affiliations and cues in any of the questions, as I 
borrowed the actual statements from two officials affiliated with the AKP. Following Jamal 
et al.’s (2014) claim that “Departures from religious orthodoxy require religious 
dispensations”, I utilized approaches towards Islamic economics that are different from the 
Hanafi school approaches in testing the party cues. Mustafa Yazicioglu, who was an AKP 
MP at the time, gave a speech about the rights of Muslim women according to Islamic law 
at a panel in 2006 organized by the AKP. He argued that the Qur’anic verses regarding 
inheritance distribution were about specific instances which were binding for these 
instances only, and that they do not constitute a general ruling (Yazicioglu, 2006). 
Professor Sami Yeprem, who was appointed by the AKP to the Presidency of Religious 
Affairs High Council in 20055, stated that according to Islamic law it is lawful to utilize 
interest based credit to purchase basic, non-luxury goods (Yeprem, 2007).  
To simplify the concepts in this study, I referred to the approaches towards 
inheritance and interest based on the Qur’anic rulings as “Hanafi school approaches”, 
whereas I referred to Mr. Yeprem’s and Mr. Yazici’s approaches as “reinterpretations”. I 
have developed my party cues based on these two statements that have diverged from the 
traditional Hanafi school approach towards Islamic Law. The party cues and related 
questions can be seen in Table 2, and the Turkish versions can be found in Appendix A):  
 
                                                          
5 The appointments to the Presidency of Religious Affairs High Council are made by the Council of Ministers, 
which was controlled by AKP in 2005. For more information: 
http://www.dinihaberler.com.tr/haber/47989/din-isleri-yuksek-kurulu-uyelikleri-belirlendi.html (Turkish) 
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Table 2 – The Wording of Experimental Items 
The Wording for Interest based transactions 
 Statement: A majority of Islamic law experts point out that conducting interest 
based transactions is forbidden in Qur’an. However, it is permissible to conduct interest-
based transactions according to the current law. A former member of the Presidency of 
Religious Affairs High Council [who was appointed by AKP]𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇 indicated that 
using interest based transactions for the basic needs is lawful according to Islamic Law. 
Question: In the scale below, the value “1” indicates that you fully agree with 
conducting interest-free banking, and the value “10” indicates that you fully agree with 
conducting interest-based banking. Would you please show how much you agree with 
conducting interest-based banking by marking where your opinion falls between “1” and 
“10”? 
The Wording for Inheritance 
 Statement: According to Qur’an, boys inherit more than girls. However, according 
to the current law, girls and boys inherit at equal amounts. 
[A former AK Party Deputy] 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇 [A former politician] 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿stated 
[at a panel conducted by AK Party] 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇that the verses in Qur’an regarding 
inheritance should be interpreted based on the time and the conditions of when they were 
revealed, and these verses do not constitute a general ruling.  
Question: In the scale below, the value “1” indicates that you fully agree with boys 
inheriting more than girls, and the value “10” indicates that you fully agree with boys and 
girls inheriting at equal amounts. Would you please show where your opinion regarding 
inheritance falls between “1” and “10” by marking the value? 
 
 Following Samuels and Zucco (2014) I used an Internet-based survey to conduct 
my experiment on party cuing by utilizing the advertisement mechanism of Facebook. The 
survey appeared on Facebook between March 27th, 2016 and April 10th, 2016, containing 
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one control group and one experimental group. An individual who completed the survey for 
one group could not complete the survey again for either the control or the treatment 
group6. 
Facebook provides its advertisers 140 characters of text and a small .jpg image to 
introduce their advertisements to their audiences. My advertisements were the same for 
both control and treatment groups, including the following text: “Participate in the Political 
and Religious Values in Turkey survey. The survey will take less than 10 minutes.7” The 
image in the advertisement contained of a colorful pie chart.  
   The survey specifically aimed at targeting Turkish speaking Facebook users in 
Turkey over 18 years old. In addition, to measure the party cuing effects of AKP voters, I 
specifically directed the ads for both the control and treatment groups to appear on the 
accounts of Facebook users who liked at least one of the following pages: Abdullah Gül  
(the former PM and President elected by the AKP deputies), Ahmet Davutoğlu8 (the former 
PM and  former head of AKP), Recep Tayyip Erdogan (the current president and the former 
AKP PM), Emine Erdoğan (the wife of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan), Necmettin Erbakan (the 
founder of the NOM movement), and the Justice and Development Party (AKP). The total 
target audience was approximately 22,000,000;  approximately 1,009,709 Facebook users 
saw the ad, and 7487 of them clicked on it. 
 The ads  directed Facebook users to new web pages which contained the consent 
forms and surveys. The respondents were  asked to read and accept consent forms, and 
those who did were  able to take the surveys.  Among 7487 individuals who clicked on the 
survey, 7094 quit after seeing the consent form. 
 
                                                          
6 Based on the IP address identification.  
7 In Turkish: “Türkiye'deki Siyasi ve Dini Değerler anketine katılın. Anket 10 dakikadan az sürecektir.” 
8 At the time that the survey was conducted, Davutoglu was both PM and the Head of AKP. 
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CHAPTER 7 
DATASET AND MODEL 
I have obtained a total of 320 respondents after excluding those who did not 
respond to the questions regarding religious, political views and party identification. 187 of 
the respondents (58.44%) were in the treatment, whereas 133 of the respondents (41.56%) 
were in the control group. The respondents were much higher educated than the average 
education of Turkish population. The following graph illustrates the discrepancies in the 
highest level of education attained between the dataset and the population of Turkey. 
 
  Graph 1 
As the graph points out, the population in dataset was much higher educated than the 
population of Turkey. While move than 60% of the respondents in the dataset were at least 
university graduates, the percentage of university graduates was just above 15% in the 
average of Turkey. The previous research (Neuwirth, 2002) has identified that higher 
educated individuals are less likely employ heuristic processing. Therefore, the survey data 
offers a conservative bias: if political parties can lead the highly educated individuals to 
utilize heuristic processing, it is likely that they can also lead the lower educated 
individuals to utilize heuristic processing. Therefore, if my hypotheses are supported with 
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the current dataset, it is likely that they will also be supported in a nationally representative 
dataset of Turkey. 
I followed Brader et al’s (2013) survey methodology to define the respondents’ affinity 
with political parties, which asked individuals to point out their closeness to political 
parties on a scale. I drew a scale between “1” and “10”, where “1” stood for “Not close at 
all” and “10” stood for “very close”. Then I asked respondents to evaluate how close they 
feel themselves to the five major political parties of Turkey based on June 7th general 
elections, namely the AKP, CHP, MHP, HDP and SP. Individuals only needed to evaluate 
their closeness to one party in the evaluation sheet to continue taking the survey. If 
individuals chose not to evaluate their closeness to a party, I marked their evaluations as a 
missing variable. 
To capture the most loyal constituencies, I also included a “trust” variable, which asked 
individuals how much they trusted to the political party that they felt the closest to in a 
scale of “1” to “10”, with “1” standing for “Not at all” and “10” standing for “I completely 
trust”.  
The dependent variables in this study are interval variables that capture the individual 
responses to the experimental questions regarding Islamic economics. The values of these 
variables range between “1” and “10”, with “1” favoring the Hanafi school based 
approaches while “10” favoring the reinterpretations initiated by the former AKP MP and 
the former member of the Presidency of Religious Affairs High Council.  
 The main independent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value “1” if the 
respondent is in the treatment group and “0” if the respondent is in the control group. The 
treatment variable is interacted with the variables that measure the closeness of individuals 
to the five major political parties. The direction of the treatment dummy variable depends 
on the size of AKP sympathizers within the sample and the strength of both in and out 
group party cuing. If there is strong in-group party cuing, I expect the impact of treatment 
variable to be positive. If there is strong out-group party cuing, I expect the impact to be 
negative. It is also possible that the impact of either in or out-group party cuing is 
superseded by the other, leading to a smaller or no significant treatment effect.  However, I 
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expect the interaction between the variable that measures closeness to the AKP and 
treatment variable to be positively and the interactions for other four political parties to 
negatively associated with the dependent variable. 
I have also included some control variables that capture the individual level 
characteristics of respondents. “Gender” is a categorical variable that takes the value “1” if 
the respondent is a male, and “0” if the respondent is female. Following Carkoglu (2004), I 
expect females to be less likely to support the Islamic inheritance law. However, the impact 
of gender on the utilization of interest remains ambiguous. In my dataset, 256 of 
respondents (80%) were male while 64 of respondents (20%) were female.  
 
       Graph 2 
Another control variable is education, ranging between (1) and (4), with (1) indicating 
that the individual has a primary school degree and (4) indicating that the individual has a 
post graduate degree. I do not expect a direct relationship between education and individual 
evaluations of the Islamic economics concepts. However, following Jamal et al.’s (2014) 
finding that cues are more effective among the less educated, I expect less educated 
individuals in the treatment group to be more likely led by the cues. 
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      Graph 3 
The individual evaluations of the Islamic economics concepts can also vary based on 
their adherence to secularism. Individuals that are more supportive of secularism might be 
more likely to support equal inheritance distribution and interest-based banking while 
disregarding the religious interpretations of the concepts. To control for the role of 
secularism, I used Carkoglu and Toprak’s (2000) questionnaire and first asked individuals 
to read a statement that said: “It is harmful for religion to influence the law order.” Then I 
asked individuals to evaluate the extent to which they agree with the statement, with the 
value “1” standing for “I don’t agree at al.” and the value “10” standing for “I totally 
agree.” I expect individuals who adhere to secularism to favor an equal inheritance 
distribution. However, I am unable to project their approach towards interest-based 
transactions, as the individual opinions regarding interest may be influenced by other moral 
concepts, such as fairness and egalitarianism. The support for secularism is negatively and 
weakly correlated with the closeness towards AKP (r:-.221, p:0.0001). 
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      Graph 4 
As the graphs suggest, the mean secularism evaluation score is higher in the treatment 
than the control group. However, the difference is not significant at 95% confidence level 
(p: 0.27) 
I have also controlled for the role of individual level religiosity by developing a self-
evaluated religiosity scale that ranged between “1” and “10”, with “1” standing for “not 
religious at all, and “10” standing for “very religious”. Non-religious individuals may be 
more likely to formulate their opinions regarding inheritance distribution and interest based 
banking without resorting to religious arguments. Therefore, their positions may differ from 
the positions of religious individuals. I also expect non-religious individuals to be more 
likely to support an equal inheritance distribution, and religious individuals to be more 
likely to support interest-free transactions. Religiosity level is positively weakly correlated 
with the closeness towards the AKP within the sample (r:.325, p:0.00).  
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     Graph 5 
It is also likely that reading Qur’an could influence individual opinions about Islamic 
economics. On the one hand, as the inheritance distribution and the ban on interest are 
described in Qur’an, individuals who read Qur’an might be more likely to follow the 
Hanafi school based approaches. On the other hand, individuals who read Qur’an may have 
also analyzed concepts of Islamic economics by studying different interpretations on the 
subject and developed a heightened awareness. Therefore, they might be more receptive of 
the reinterpretations. Overall, the association between reading Qur’an and the likelihood of 
supporting the reinterpretations is ambiguous. I controlled for the role of Qur’an in shaping 
individual positions through two control variables: one variable asked individuals to 
measure how often they read their holy book, with “1” standing for “I don’t read it”, “2” 
standing for “I read it once in a while”, “3” standing for “I read it almost every day” and 
“4” standing for “I read it every day”. Another variable asked individuals whether they 
have read the translation of their holy book in Turkish, with “1” standing for “Yes” and “0” 
standing for “No”. Among the respondents who responded to questions about their Holy 
Book, I restricted the dataset to only who defined themselves as Muslim to the question that 
asked “Are you Muslim?”, accounting for 89.69% of the overall sample.  Among the 
respondents who indicated that they are Muslims, the frequency of reading the holy book 
and closeness with the AKP was weakly correlated (r:.352, p:0.00), whereas there was no 
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significant correlation between reading the Turkish version of Qur’an and supporting the 
AKP. 
 
      Graph 6 
 
      Graph 7 
An individual’s support for interest-based transactions could be associated with that 
individual’s views towards competition. An individual supportive of competition might be 
more inclined to support interest-based transactions than an individual who thinks that 
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competition is harmful, as interest is often associated with the concepts of free market 
economy and competition. To control for the impact on individual views on competition, I 
borrowed a question from WWS 2005-2006 wave, which asked individuals to evaluate a 
statement between “1” and “10”, with “1” indicating “Competition is good. It stimulates 
people to work hard and develop new ideas” whereas “10” stated “Competition is harmful. 
It brings out the worst of people”.  
 
      Graph 8 
 More descriptive graphs regarding the characteristics of the dataset can be found in the 
appendix.  
CHAPTER 8 
RESULTS  
There might be a collinearity within the closeness scores. The AKP and CHP 
closeness scores are negatively correlated and at the highest strength on the comparison 
among all parties (p:00, r:-.42). The following graphs, obtained through the dataset, also 
displays the negative correlation. The group of individuals scoring high on their closeness 
to AKP had low mean CHP closeness scores, whereas the group of individuals scoring low 
on their closeness to CHP had low mean AKP closeness scores. 
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   Graph 9 
 
   Graph 10 
 In order to avoid the collinearity problem, I conducted my tests on separate models 
with AKP and CHP closeness scores. I have utilized four separate models for each test. In 
the fourth model, I included all the variables that I deemed relevant for the tests. In the third 
model I excluded some variables based on results from the joint significance tests. In the 
second model, I included the treatment variable with basic control variables for 
demographics as well as the variables that measure the party closeness scores. In the first 
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model, I only included the treatment variable with basic control variables for 
demographics. The graphs derived from the tests are based on the fourth models, which are 
the models including all the control variables. 
My analysis involved several steps. First, I conducted my analysis on the whole dataset 
irrespective of party affiliation as I interacted the party variables with the treatment 
variable. As the dependent variables have consisted of intervals [1,10], I employed the 
multiple linear regression model. The results for the interest issue are below: 
 
    Graph 11 
As the dataset of interest scores failed Shapiro-Wilk normality test, I conducted an 
ANOVA analysis. 
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   Graph 12 
 The ANOVA analysis indicates that the difference between the two groups is 
significant at the 90% confidence level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yasun 31 
 
  
 
Table 3 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Coef./SE Coef./SE Coef./SE Coef./SE
Treatment 0.668* 0.584 -0.329 -1.167
(0.386) (0.714) (0.911) (2.169)
Gender 0.693 0.358 0.173 0.330
(0.463) (0.519) (0.488) (0.467)
Education 0.066 -0.047 -0.050 0.273
(0.222) (0.260) (0.247) (0.384)
AKP -0.263*** -0.139 -0.109
(0.082) (0.090) (0.092)
AKP*Treatment -0.084 -0.126 -0.157
(0.111) (0.121) (0.125)
Secularism 0.102* 0.096
(0.059) (0.061)
Religiosity -0.387*** -0.397***
(0.108) (0.129)
Religiosity*Treatment 0.222 0.399**
(0.155) (0.174)
Competition Perception 0.081
(0.095)
Education*Treatment -0.280
(0.518)
Read Qur'an in Turkish -0.447
(0.587)
The Frequency of Reading Qur'an -0.819**
(0.356)
The Frequency of Reading Qur'an*Treatment 0.191
(0.556)
Constant 3.468*** 5.100*** 6.152*** 7.206***
(0.746) (1.004) (1.206) (1.911)
R2 0.018 0.149 0.213 0.256
Adjusted R2 0.008 0.127 0.180 0.197
Root MSE 3.401 3.023 2.930 2.887
N 320.000 198.000 198.000 179.000
* p<0.10,  ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
DV: Evaluations on the Interest Issue
Linear Regression Results for Evaluations on the Interest Issue
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       Graph 13 
The marginal effects graphs show that there is no statistically significant treatment 
effect, as the confidence intervals overlap within the units of AKP closeness score.  
The dataset in models two, three and four significantly dropped because individuals 
that did not evaluate their closeness to AKP, and individuals who did not consider 
themselves as Muslim were excluded from the dataset. The results do not indicate any 
significant treatment effect on AKP closeness score, meaning that at each unit of closeness 
score there is no difference between the control and treatment groups. A unit of increase in 
the closeness to AKP is associated with .26 units of shifts in favor of the Hanafi school 
approach at 90% confidence level in one model. Among the control variables, a unit of 
increase in the frequency of Quran is associated with .82 units of shifts in favor of the 
reinterpretation. A unit of increase in religiosity is associated with .38 units of shift in favor 
of the Hanafi school approach. However, the impact of religiosity is superseded by the 
treatment effect in the last model.  
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Table 4 
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 Graph 14 
The marginal effects graphs show that there is no statistically significant treatment 
effect, as the confidence intervals overlap within the units of CHP closeness score.  
There is no statistically significant difference for the predicted values of the 
dependent variable for the units that are in the treatment group and the units that are in the 
control group. However, the effect of CHP closeness score is conditional whether the units 
of closeness fall under the control group or treatment group. In the control group, a unit of 
increase in CHP closeness score is associated with .36 units of shifts in favor of the 
reinterpretations. The direction for the relationship is also positive in the treatment group, 
but the slope of the relationship is smaller. In the treatment group a unit of increase in CHP 
closeness score is associated with about .13 units of shifts in favor of the reinterpretation. 
The statistically significant factor explaining this change on CHP closeness score between 
the control and treatment groups is the negative treatment effect of CHP closeness score 
(p:0.057), as displayed in the graph below. 
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        Graph 15 
The decrease of the slope between the control and treatment groups can be 
explained by the out-group party cuing effect, as proposed in the Third Hypothesis9.  
The results for the inheritance issue are below: 
 
       Graph 16 
                                                          
9 The results on MHP, HDP, SP closeness scores have been removed because they did not lead to any 
significant treatment effects on party cuing. 
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       Graph 17 
The ANOVA test on the control and treatment groups did not yield significant 
results at 95% confidence level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yasun 37 
 
  
 
Table 5 
 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Coef./SE Coef./SE Coef./SE Coef./SE
Treatment -0.091 0.098 0.802 0.789
(0.359) (0.522) (0.603) (2.082)
Gender -0.056 0.237 0.208 0.383
(0.426) (0.526) (0.440) (0.490)
Education -0.108 -0.149 -0.120 -0.116
(0.211) (0.282) (0.258) (0.360)
AKP -0.301*** -0.195** -0.164
(0.088) (0.099) (0.109)
AKP*Treatment -0.173 -0.123 -0.128
(0.119) (0.127) (0.141)
Secularism 0.192*** 0.180***
(0.061) (0.064)
Religiosity -0.167* -0.120
(0.095) (0.133)
Religiosity*Treatment -0.139 -0.084
(0.132) (0.175)
Education*Treatment 0.015
(0.529)
Read Qur'an in Turkish -0.366
(0.759)
The Frequency of Reading Qur'an -0.651
(0.575)
The Frequency of Reading Qur'an*Treatment -0.170
(0.747)
Constant 8.594*** 9.792*** 8.967*** 10.364***
(0.688) (1.001) (1.069) (1.560)
R2 0.001 0.219 0.321 0.329
Adjusted R2 -0.008 0.199 0.293 0.280
Root MSE 3.184 3.032 2.849 2.953
N 320.000 198.000 198.000 179.000
* p<0.10,  ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01
Linear Regression Results for Evaluations on the Inheritance Issue
DV: Evaluations on the Inheritance Issue
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       Graph 18 
The marginal effects graphs show that there is no statistically significant treatment 
effect. 
The results suggest that in two of the models a unit of increase in AKP closeness 
score is associated with between .20 and .30 units of change in favor of the Hanafi school 
approach. However, this significant relationship disappears once more control variables are 
introduced. Among the control variables, the coefficient of secularism variable ranges 
between .14 and .19, that is a unit of increase in secularism is associated with between .14 
and .19 units of shift in favor of the reinterpretation at 99% confidence level. 
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Table 6 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
(0.359) (0.870) (1.470) (2.051)
Gender -0.056 0.107 0.042 0.024
(0.426) (0.413) (0.352) (0.388)
Education -0.108 -0.162 -0.267 -0.109
(0.211) (0.238) (0.233) (0.413)
CHP 0.220** 0.192** 0.198**
(0.088) (0.097) (0.096)
CHP_treatment 0.124 0.038 0.011
(0.113) (0.115) (0.114)
The Frequency of Reading Qur'an -0.970** -0.828
(0.461) (0.582)
The Frequency of Reading Qur'an*Treatment -0.294 -0.238
(0.572) (0.689)
Secularism 0.194*** 0.186***
(0.058) (0.057)
Education*Treatment -0.249
(0.505)
Read Qur'an in Turkish -0.156
(0.485)
Religiosity -0.087
(0.139)
Religiosity*Treatment -0.047
(0.161)
Constant 8.594*** 7.981*** 9.210*** 9.112***
(0.688) (0.909) (1.290) (1.519)
R2 0.001 0.146 0.318 0.329
Adjusted R2 -0.008 0.127 0.289 0.285
Root MSE 3.184 2.670 2.529 2.535
N 320.000 226.000 197.000 197.000
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01
Linear Regression Results for Evaluations on the Inheritance Issue
DV: Evaluations on the Inheritance Issue
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        Graph 19 
The marginal effects graphs show that there is no statistically significant treatment 
effect. A unit of increase in CHP closeness score is associated with between .2 and .22 units 
of change in favor of the Hanafi school approach at 95% confidence level. Among the 
control variables, a unit of increase in the frequency of reading Qur’an is associated with 
between .97 units of shift in favor of the Hanafi school approach at 95% confidence level in 
one model. However, this effect disappears once more variables are included. A unit of 
increase in secularism perception is associated with between .19 and .2 units of shift in 
favor of the reinterpretation at 99% confidence level.  
Hypotheses 1 and 2 emphasized that the party cuing effect was effective on 
individuals who felt close to the AKP. I decided to restrict my dataset to only those 
individuals who felt closeness to the AKP in order to test these two hypotheses. I first 
considered “5” as an arbitrary number of closeness to the AKP by grouping individuals 
who have evaluated their closeness to the AKP with at least “5” score and tested my 
hypotheses on them. While conducting this regression I kept the interaction variable 
between the closeness to the AKP and the treatment group intact, observing whether the 
party closeness within the treatment group was associated with changes in the dependent 
variable among the group of individuals who felt affinity with the AKP. The results for 
interest issue are below:  
Yasun 41 
 
  
 
 
 
       Graph 20 
Conducting a t-test revealed that there is no significant difference between the two 
groups (p=.975). 
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Table 7 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
(0.645) (3.222) (3.092) (4.977)
Gender -0.015 -0.025 0.049 0.100
(0.766) (0.770) (0.744) (0.676)
Education -0.261 -0.286 -0.199 -0.233
(0.370) (0.368) (0.371) (0.630)
AKP -0.304 -0.380 -0.340
(0.283) (0.263) (0.308)
AKP*Treatment 0.198 0.253 0.285
(0.354) (0.341) (0.385)
Competition Perception 0.194 0.260*
(0.128) (0.135)
Education*Treatment 0.348
(0.763)
Read Qur'an in Turkish -0.574
(1.132)
The Frequency of Reading Qur'an -0.883
(0.571)
The Frequency of Reading Qur'an*Treatment 0.696
(0.806)
Secularism 0.088
(0.082)
Religiosity -0.307
(0.235)
Religiosity*Treatment 0.049
(0.315)
Constant 3.565** 6.388** 5.929** 9.766**
(1.373) (3.062) (2.791) (4.528)
R2 0.006 0.023 0.059 0.184
Adjusted R2 -0.029 -0.037 -0.011 0.037
Root MSE 3.020 3.031 2.993 2.855
N 88.000 88.000 88.000 86.000
* p<0.10,  ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01
Linear Regression Results for Evaluations on the Interest Issue (AKP≥5)
DV: Evaluations on the Interest Issue
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   Graph 21 
The marginal effects graphs show that there is no statistically significant treatment 
effect. In addition, there is no significant treatment effect on the individuals’ closeness with 
the AKP and their evaluation of interest issue. Among the control variables, a unit of 
increase in the perception of competition as a harmful activity is associated with .26 units 
of change in favor of interest based banking at 95% confidence level. The results for 
inheritance issue are below:  
 
         Graph 22 
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Conducting a t-test revealed that there is no significant difference between the two 
groups (p:.14) 
Table 8 
  
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Treatment -1.100 1.422 2.857 2.810
(0.828) (3.688) (3.771) (4.189)
Gender -0.620 -0.485 -0.440 -0.219
(0.926) (0.912) (0.739) (0.774)
Education -0.674 -0.658 -0.522 0.222
(0.425) (0.426) (0.390) (0.571)
AKP -0.080 0.074 0.040
(0.272) (0.270) (0.251)
AKP*Treatment -0.304 -0.284 -0.290
(0.427) (0.409) (0.398)
Secularism 0.256** 0.266**
(0.108) (0.114)
Religiosity -0.336 -0.303
(0.301) (0.323)
Religiosity*Treatment -0.187 -0.084
(0.358) (0.385)
Education*Treatment -0.707
(0.731)
Read Qur'an in Turkish -2.506**
(1.203)
The Frequency of Reading Qur'an -0.536
(0.800)
The Frequency of Reading Qur'an*Treatment 0.420
(1.039)
Constant 8.935*** 9.518*** 8.724*** 10.287***
(1.423) (2.858) (2.936) (3.248)
R2 0.055 0.075 0.222 0.278
Adjusted R2 0.021 0.018 0.143 0.159
Root MSE 3.798 3.803 3.553 3.538
N 88.000 88.000 88.000 86.000
* p<0.10,  ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01
Linear Regression Results for Evaluations on the Inheritance Issue (AKP≥5)
DV: Evaluations on the Inheritance Issue
Yasun 45 
 
  
 
 
       Graph 23 
The marginal effects graphs show that there is no statistically significant treatment 
effect. 
The results for inheritance among individuals who felt affinity with the AKP 
suggest that there is no significant treatment effect. Among control variables, individuals 
who read Qur’an in Turkish are 2.5 units more likely to support the Hanafi school approach 
at 95% confidence level. A unit increase along the scale in favor of secularism is associated 
with between .26 and .27 units of changes in favor of the reinterpretation at 95% 
confidence level. 
Overall, measuring the party cues on the absolute values of self-evaluated closeness 
to the AKP did not yield any significant results. Following Brader and Tucker (2012) I also 
examined the party cues only on the individuals who felt closest to the AKP than the other 
parties; that is the individuals who indicated the highest closeness score for the AKP. I also 
included the trust variable in my analysis, which measured the respondents’ levels of trust 
to the political party that they felt closest to.   
The results for the interest issue are below: 
 
Yasun 46 
 
  
 
 
 
        Graph 24 
 The ANOVA analysis indicates that the difference between the two groups is not 
significant at the 95% confidence level. 
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Table 9 
   
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Coef./SE Coef./SE Coef./SE Coef./SE
Treatment 0.385 2.079 2.591 0.964
(0.783) (2.164) (2.215) (3.774)
Gender 0.290 0.310 0.350 0.229
(0.886) (0.907) (0.907) (0.917)
Education -0.411 -0.485 -0.436 -0.003
(0.450) (0.470) (0.472) (0.673)
AKP 0.048 0.071 0.199
(0.187) (0.188) (0.208)
AKP*Treatment -0.203 -0.255 -0.495
(0.271) (0.275) (0.303)
Trust -0.086 -0.126 -0.103
(0.212) (0.215) (0.221)
Trust*Treatment -0.026 -0.026 0.191
(0.293) (0.292) (0.325)
Competition Perception 0.143 0.199
(0.135) (0.139)
Education*Treatment -0.104
(0.992)
Read Qur'an in Turkish -0.335
(1.140)
The Frequency of Reading Qur'an -0.518
(0.533)
Secularism 0.090
(0.109)
Religiosity -0.341
(0.279)
Religiosity*Treatment 0.306
(0.393)
Constant 3.963*** 4.318** 3.554* 4.621*
(1.376) (1.915) (2.044) (2.731)
R2 0.018 0.039 0.055 0.135
Adjusted R2 -0.024 -0.062 -0.060 -0.074
Root MSE 3.305 3.366 3.363 3.326
N 75.000 75.000 75.000 73.000
* p<0.10,  ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01
Linear Regression Results for Evaluations on the Interest Issue (AKP Closest)
DV: Evaluations on the Interest Issue
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    Graph 25 
The marginal effects graphs show that there is no statistically significant treatment 
effect.  
 
        Graph 26 
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In addition, there is no statistically significant treatment effect on trust variable.  
The results for the inheritance issue are below:  
 
       Graph 27 
The ANOVA analysis indicates that the difference between the two groups is not 
significant at the 95% confidence level. 
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Table 10 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Coef./SE Coef./SE Coef./SE Coef./SE
Treatment -0.627 0.618 1.406 2.405
(0.892) (2.374) (2.711) (3.776)
Gender -0.242 -0.125 0.028 0.099
(1.009) (0.995) (0.897) (0.919)
Education -0.978* -1.175** -0.661 -0.231
(0.513) (0.515) (0.487) (0.676)
AKP -0.393* -0.203 -0.219
(0.205) (0.192) (0.208)
AKP*Treatment 0.246 0.093 0.130
(0.297) (0.275) (0.301)
Trust 0.143 0.127 0.142
(0.233) (0.212) (0.219)
Trust*Treatment -0.435 -0.137 -0.271
(0.321) (0.297) (0.327)
Secularism 0.343*** 0.306***
(0.103) (0.109)
Religiosity -0.298 -0.271
(0.245) (0.280)
Religiosity*Treatment -0.243 -0.093
(0.331) (0.394)
Education*Treatment -0.593
(0.996)
Read Qur'an in Turkish -1.575
(1.143)
The Frequency of Reading Qur'an -0.418
(0.535)
Constant 9.464*** 11.636*** 9.224*** 10.542***
(1.568) (2.100) (2.219) (2.654)
R2 0.058 0.147 0.349 0.369
Adjusted R2 0.019 0.058 0.247 0.230
Root MSE 3.767 3.692 3.300 3.344
N 75.000 75.000 75.000 73.000
* p<0.10,  ** p<0.05,  *** p<0.01
Linear Regression Results for Evaluations on the Inheritance Issue (AKP Closest)
DV: Evaluations on the Interest Issue
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    Graph 28 
The marginal effects graphs show that there is no statistically significant treatment 
effect.  
 
        Graph 29 
In addition, there is no statistically significant treatment effect on trust variable. In 
all models, a unit of increase in self evaluated secularism score is associated with shifting 
towards the reinterpretation with between .31 and .34 units at 99% confidence level.  
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Having measured the affinity with the AKP on both relative and absolute scales, 
none of my tests regarding yielded any significant results regarding the ability of the AKP 
in leading opinions among the closest voters.  
CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION  
The results showed that regarding the interest issue, the effect of CHP closeness 
score was conditional on whether the units of closeness fell under the control group or 
treatment group. The direction for the relationship was positive for both control and 
treatment groups, but the slope of the relationship was smaller for the treatment group. 
Therefore, the results indicated that the support for religious doctrines was conditional on 
the party label and provided some evidence supporting Hypothesis 3. However, CHP 
closeness score in the treatment group was still positively associated with supporting the 
reinterpretation but had a smaller slope than the slope of the control group. Thus, out-group 
party cuing only succeeded in moving the slope downward.  
To my knowledge, this is the first study to suggest the presence of out-group party 
cuing regarding leading opinions in religious matters. The findings of this study are in 
conformity with findings of Adkins et al. (2013), which suggested that religious groups 
were not successful in leading the opinions of individuals belonging to their groups in 
socio-economic issues, but religious groups were successful in leading the opinions of 
individuals outside of their groups regarding the same issues. In addition, the current study 
found that religiosity had significant role in some models on evaluating religious 
discourses, unlike the previous research by Jamal et al (2014) that found very limited 
impact of religiosity on evaluating religious discourses. In the unrestricted dataset, 
increasing religiosity was associated with the increasing likelihood of supporting Hanafi 
school approach at 95% confidence level. However, the treatment effect of religiosity was 
in favor of the reinterpretations, superseding the initial negative effect. 
It is important to note that the out-group treatment effect is only significant 
regarding the interest issue and not significant regarding the inheritance issue. In both 
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inheritance and interest issues, closeness to the CHP was associated with higher levels of 
association towards the reinterpretations initiated by the officials linked with the AKP. As 
previously mentioned, the correlation coefficient between closeness to the CHP and AKP 
score is negatively significant (p:00, r:-.42) and at the highest strength on the comparison 
among all parties. As Adkins et al (2013) stated following their findings about out-group 
party cuing regarding religious matters on Democrats, “the reason (for the cues to lead 
opinions among Democrats) …. is not primarily that they (Democrats) tend to be liberals 
and be religiously unaffiliated or have low levels of religious commitment. There is 
something about Democratic identification itself that leads people in a liberal direction in 
response to this cue.” As Carkoglu and Kalaycioglu (2007) stated regarding the high rates 
of Shariah approval among the Turkish electorate, the treatment effect of the CHP 
sympathizers on the interest issue may be due to the dissatisfaction with the AKP rather 
than doctrine based positions on the interest issue influenced by the statements associated 
with the AKP. While the CHP sympathizers may have fixed views regarding equal 
inheritance distribution based on their ethical and moral perspectives that prevented out-
party cuing in favor of unequal inheritance distribution, their views towards interest might 
be less influenced by morals and ethics, allowing their dissatisfaction with the AKP to lead 
their opinions.  However, these assessments are merely speculations as this research could 
not statistically identify a mechanism that explains the out-group party cuing, which was 
also the case in the other experimental studies on opinion framing (Adkins et al. 2013, 
Samuel and Zucco, 2014). The future research can try to identify the causal linkage 
between out-group party cuing and opinion leading and examine why out-group party cues 
have been more successful than in-group party cues in leading opinions regarding religious 
matters. 
Contrary to the initial expectations this experimental study did not find any 
significant party cuing effects in AKP’s ability of leading opinion on religious matters 
within the position ascribed to the party. This study faced some significant limitations in 
finding out the party cuing effects. Therefore, the results are far from alluding that there is 
no in-group party cuing in moral or religious matters in Turkey among AKP’s electorate, 
and that religious matters are off-limits of political parties in leading opinions among their 
constituencies.  
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First, the education level of the respondents was far higher than the average in 
Turkey, or the average in most of the experiments on party cuing. As more educated 
individuals are less likely to utilize heuristic information processing (Neuwirth, 2002), they 
are less likely to utilize party cues in formulating their opinions. Thus, the education level 
of the sample may have caused biased results that prevented the parties from leading the 
opinions.  
Second, I could not find any statements by the main cadre of AKP with regards to 
the debates on Islamic economics. As a result, the party cues remained too weak. The most 
candid statement that I found on the interest debate came from Recep Tayyip Erdogan in 
2006, in which he stated: “Let’s not limit ourselves to the Islamic interest-based issues. 
Let’s play [the financial game] according to the international rules. Let’s look into the 
features of interest. Let’s redefine interest (Internethaber, 2006)10.” Even this statement is 
full of ambiguity, as it does not take any position either in favor of or against interest-based 
economics. Thus, I had to resort to the statements of an Islamic theologian appointed by the 
AKP in framing the position regarding interest. This may have distorted the party cue 
taking through two main mechanisms. First, the theologian had merely any ties with the 
AKP besides having been appointed by an AKP-led government, thus it may have been 
difficult for voters to establish any linkage between the theologian and the political party. 
Second, the official title of the theologian, a member of the high council of the directorate 
of religious affairs, carried a certain weight within itself, possibly outweighing the weight 
of having been appointed by the AKP. The pervious research has identified that endorsers 
can lead the opinions of individuals when individuals perceive the endorsers to be both 
knowledgeable and to share their interests (Lupia and McCubbins, 1998; Druckan and 
Lupia, 2000) Therefore, when individuals read the statement, they might have given more 
consideration to the title of the theologian as a knowledgeable person, and religious 
individuals to sharing their interests, rather than the fact that he was appointed by the AKP. 
I faced the same barrier in establishing a strong party cue as I tried to frame opinions 
                                                          
10 Erdogan’s statement in Turkish is "İslami faiz meselesiyle kendimizi sınırlamayalım. Uluslararası kurallara 
göre oynayalım. Dolayısıyla faizin niteliğinin ne olacağına bakalım. Faizi yeniden tanımlayalım." 
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regarding inheritance through the AKP, since I could only find the statements of a former 
AKP MP evaluating the Qur’anic doctrine regarding inheritance.  
The third barrier in this study was the small sample size, particularly the low 
percentage of respondents who felt affinity with AKP. I set up Facebook to specifically 
target individuals who liked the pages relevant to the AKP and AKP leaders, and merely 75 
respondents (23%) identified themselves to feel closest to the AKP, even though the vote 
share of the AKP in the last general election (November, 2015) was 49.5%. The total 
number of individuals completing the survey (320) was about 4% of the individuals 
accessing the consent form (7487), a strikingly low percentage. This can be accounted by 
the low percentage of Turks in trusting to others. In a 2008 OECD study, only 24% of 
Turkish individuals were found to express high levels of trust to others, whereas the OECD 
average was 59% (Alberti, 2008).  
I also suspect that the dataset was not representative of the ordinary AKP 
sympathizers. In order to complete the survey the respondents needed access to internet and 
have a Facebook account, which may have skewed the dataset towards wealthier AKP 
voters with a more established knowledge and views in Islamic economics, preventing the 
party cues in leading their opinions.  
Another potential problem was that I did not have the tools to control the 
respondents’ environment. As a result, I was not able to ensure that that the respondents 
read the party cues and the questions carefully.   
Because of these barriers, I tried to conduct my experiment at the conservative 
districts of Istanbul, such as Fatih. However, the individuals were extremely reluctant to 
answer questions about religion and political views, let alone signing the consent forms.  
 Despite all of the shortcomings of this study, I still believe that the strong party 
affiliation in Turkey, coupled with the shifts in the electoral platform of the NOM, provide 
a very formidable ground to test the extent to which party cues can shape the voters’ 
opinions on religious matters. Therefore, the results of the current research should not 
discourage the scholars of political behavior from investigating the role of political parties 
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in shaping the opinions on religious matters in Turkey. However, I recommend the future 
researchers to take into account certain mechanisms to avoid biased results. I particularly 
recommend conducting the experiment face to face with a nationally representative sample 
of voters in a controlled environment, which would ensure that the educational attainment 
of respondents be in line with the average educational attainment in Turkey, and the 
respondents can concentrate on the questions and party cues without any distractions.  
Second, I would recommend the researchers to try to locate statements regarding 
Islamic economics from the high ranked political party officials. The ongoing process of 
writing a new constitution may open up new debates regarding the role of religion in 
governing the society. For instance, the speaker of the parliament stated recently that the 
new constitution should be Islamic (Hurriyet, 2016). Although his statement was quickly 
refuted by the main cadre of the AKP, including Erdogan, such debates may bring to the 
fore statements regarding Islamic economics again, enabling scholars to find suitable 
statements to explore the party cuing effects. 
 I also believe that the party cuing effect needs to be tested in other Muslim majority 
countries, including Tunisia, where a party with Islamist background-Ennahda has shifted 
its focus from “Islamism in its original, utopian form… toward a tendency to 
emphasize existing Islamic mores and values within Tunisian society as key reference 
points (Netterstrøm, 2015).” In its 2016 party congress, Ennahda stated that it distanced 
itself from political Islam and decided to focus on “practical programmes” (Rifai, 2016). 
However, Ennahda still favors more conservative approaches than the AKP regarding 
Islamic economics. The party leans towards the division of inheritance as stipulated in 
Qur’an (Ouazghari, 2014; Al-Hilali 2011) and as the party’s electoral platform of 2011 
stated, the party favored the reduction in the fraction of Tunisia’s funding from “foreign 
interest based sources” and their replacement by “Islamic financial products (Ennahdha 
Movement Programme, 2011).”  However, the party has pledged to uphold the Personal 
Status Code of Tunisia (Lewis, 2011), which meant that it stood against polygamy, 
supported gender parity between men and women as witnesses in courts and provided 
women more extensive rights in divorce cases than the Hanafi-school-based approaches. 
This recent shift in Tunisia may lead to ambiguity among Ennahda voters about the long 
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held views in Islamism and personal code and as a result might lead to significant party 
cuing effects on religious matters. It would be also interesting to see the party cuing effects 
regarding interest-based banking among Sunni Muslims in Lebanon, where the Future 
Movement, the party representing the Sunni Muslims, controls a large number of the 
country’s financial products. 
In addition to the party cuing, I observed the lack of statements within the AKP 
circle regarding Islamic economics, which may suggest an absence of strong theological 
origins in dropping the themes of Islamic economics from the party program. A 
comparative examination of the theological and pragmatic underpinnings of Islamist parties 
for dropping the Islamist platforms from their party programs would also be a very valuable 
topic to research. 
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CHAPTER 11 
APPENDIX 
Table 11: The Wording of Experimental Items in Turkish 
The Wording for Interest based transactions (Faiz) 
 Statement: İslam hukuku uzmanlarının çoğunluğu faizin Kuran’da yasaklandığını 
belirtmektedir. Oysa bugünkü kanunda faizle işlem yapmak serbesttir. Diyanet İşleri 
Başkanlığı Din İşleri Yüksek Kurulunun   
 [Ak Parti hükümeti tarafından atanmış] 𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇, eski bir üyesi temel ihtiyaçlar için 
faizli kredi kullanmanın İslam’a göre caiz olduğunu (dinen yasak olmadığını) belirtmiştir. 
Question: Aşağıdaki cetvelde “1” faizsiz bankacılık yapılmasına, “10” ise faizli 
bankacılık yapılmasına bütünüyle katıldığınızı göstermektedir. Faizli bankacılık 
yapılmasına ne kadar katıldığınızı görüşünüzün “1” ile “10” arasında nereye düştüğünü 
işaretleyerek belirtir misiniz? 
The Wording for Inheritance (Miras) 
 Statement: Kur’an’a göre göre kız çocukları mirastan erkek çocuklarına göre daha 
az pay alıyorlar. Oysa bugünkü kanunda kız ve erkek çocukları eşit oranda miras 
almaktadırlar. [𝐸𝑠𝑘𝑖 𝑏𝑖𝑟 𝐴𝐾 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖 𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑣𝑒𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑖]𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇 
[𝐸𝑠𝑘𝑖 𝑏𝑖𝑟 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑣𝑒𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑖]𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿[𝐴𝐾 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑓𝚤𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑛 𝑑ü𝑧𝑒𝑛𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑛]𝑇𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇 bir 
panelde yaptığı konuşmada Kur’andaki miras ile ilgili ayetlerin indiği zaman ve sosyal 
şartlara dikkat edilerek yorumlanması gerektiğini ve bu ayetlerin genel bir hüküm 
oluşturmadığını belirtmiştir. 
 
Question: Aşağıdaki cetvelde “1” erkek çocuklara daha fazla miras verilmesine, 
“10” ise kız ve erkek çocuklarına eşit oranlarda miras verilmesine bütünüyle katıldığınızı 
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göstermektedir. Miras ile ilgili görüşünüzün “1” ile “10” arasında nereye düştüğünü 
işaretleyerek belirtir misiniz? 
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